This is highwayrobbery.net's Oct. 2012 "save" of a former page at the website of the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS): Summary of decisions concerning automated enforcement as of March 2010 Camera or automated enforcement is a method of using technology to photograph violations of traffic law. Cameras are aimed at vehicle tags and, in some states, drivers and tags. Red light and photoradar camera enforcement does not use surveillance cameras that indiscriminately record everything in view. No photograph is taken in the absence of a violation. Red light cameras are triggered by sensors embedded in the road when a driver enters the intersection against the light. Speed cameras are triggered when a driver's speed, measured by radar, exceeds a specified speed, usually well above the speed limit. Jurisdictions choose the speed that activates the camera. Similarly, they choose how long after the light turns red that the camera is activated. This enables officials to ensure that only unambiguous violations are photographed. Citations are mailed to the registered owners of the vehicles when a review of the photographs demonstrates that an offense has occurred. Typically, the offense is civil and a fine is the only consequence. Drivers are given a hearing to contest the citations. The following sections summarize decisions dealing with a variety of issues relevant to camera enforcement. Because many camera enforcement laws treat violations as the equivalent of parking tickets, decisions on parking tickets are included. Decriminalization Can a local jurisdiction enact an ordinance creating a civil offense similar to an offense that is criminal under state law? In 1987, the Illinois legislature authorized municipalities to decriminalize parking violations and substitute a civil penalty system which handled parking citations administratively. Chicago did so in 1990. Under the Chicago ordinance, the ticket was prima facie evidence of a violation. The ticket could be contested at an administrative hearing held by lawyers hired by the city, with appeal to the county circuit court. The maximum fine was $100. The ordinance was challenged as a violation of due process under two theories. First, the plaintiffs claimed that because parking violations have traditionally been treated as criminal offenses, they may not be reclassified as civil and the procedural safeguards afforded criminal defendants may not be reduced. The court noted that "nothing in the due process clause forbids the reclassification of criminal offenses as civil violations. … A criminal fine of $100 is much less severe than many incontestably civil penalties, so if the state decides to convert it to a civil penalty there is no reason to impose the safeguards of criminal procedure. It is extraordinarily common, moreover, for a statute to carry both civil and criminal penalties. …And even if … some weird ratchet decreed that once a criminal penalty, always a criminal penalty, nothing in the constitution prevents a state from relaxing the conventional safeguards of the criminal process in tandem with a lightening of the penalties." Van Harken v. City of Chicago, 103 F.3d 1346 (7th Cir. 1997). In a red light camera case, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina cited Van Harken, finding that the North Carolina state camera enforcement statute and the High Point ordinance created a civil offense. Consequently, the court upheld the ordinance against a challenge under due process. Shavitz v. City of High Point, 270 F.Supp 2d 702 (M.D.N.C. 2003), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Shavitz v. Guilford County Board of Education, 100 Fed. Appx 146 (4th Cir. 2004), remanded to 630 S.E.2d 4 (N.C. 2006). Shavitz' challenges included the presumption that the registered owner of the vehicle drove the vehicle when the offense occurred; that the hearing violated the confrontation clause; that the appeal form was inadequate; that the hearing officers were not sufficiently impartial; that the contractors were engaged in the unauthorized practice of law; that the appeal bond was excessive and violated rights of indigents; and that the presumption and $50 fine constituted an unlawful taking. The Ohio Supreme Court concluded that Akron's ordinance imposing a civil, not criminal, sanction on speeding in a school zone did not conflict with state law under which it was a criminal offense. The court noted, "[t]his argument [that decriminalization creates a conflict with state law], however, reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the actual effect of the Akron ordinance. The ordinance does not change the speed limits established by state law or change the ability of police officers to cite offenders for traffic violations. After the enactment of the Akron ordinance, a person who speeds and is observed by a police officer remains subject to the usual traffic laws. Only when no police officer is present and the automated camera captures the speed infraction does the Akron ordinance apply …. The Akron ordinance complements rather than conflicts with state law." Mendenhall et al. v. City of Akron et al., 881 N.E.2d 255 (Ohio 2008). LINK* TO CASE DOCUMENTATION (PDF) http://www.supremecourtofohio.gov/rod/newpdf/0/2008/2008-Ohio-270.pdf The Tennessee Court of Appeals has held that imposing a $50 fine for a red light camera violation does not make the offense criminal in nature. Knoxville v. Brown, No. E2007-01906-COA-R3-CV, July 20, 2008. LINK* TO CASE DOCUMENTATION (PDF) http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/OPINIONS/TCA/PDF/083/CityofKnoxvilleOPN.pdf Procedural adequacy Is an administrative hearing in which photographs are offered as proof of the offense sufficient to comply with the requirements of due process? The second claim by the plaintiffs in Van Harken was that the procedures for adjudicating parking tickets under the Chicago ordinance were inadequate even for civil proceedings. Specifically, they argued that the procedure should have required the officer who issued the ticket to be present at the hearing; that the hearing officer should not have been permitted to cross examine the drivers; and that the hearing officers were not sufficiently independent because they worked at the pleasure of the City's Director of Revenue. The court dismissed these allegations, citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), for the proposition that a cost-benefit analysis is required to determine the process that is due in a given case. The court noted the high cost of requiring the citing officer to be present compared to the cost of an adverse decision in the few cases in which an officer's presence would affect the outcome of the hearing. The court noted that there is no absolute right of confrontation in civil cases and that the hearing officer's subpoena power provided a safeguard in cases in which an officer's presence appeared necessary. Van Harken v. City of Chicago, 103 F.3d 1346 (7th Cir. 1997). On the issue of the independence of the hearing officers, the court noted that they were hourly employees who only worked when there were cases to be heard and that their compensation did not depend on the outcomes of the hearings they handled. The Van Harken state constitutional claims were decided by the Illinois Court of Appeals. Even though the Illinois due process provisions provide broader protection than that afforded by the U.S. Constitution, in Van Harken II, the court nonetheless upheld the Chicago ordinance under claims that it violated the separation of powers and due process provisions of the Illinois Constitution. Van Harken v. City of Chicago, 713 N.E.2d 754 (Ill. 1999). In the absence of a state law governing the use of automated enforcement, the Missouri Supreme Court held that municipalities that utilize red light camera enforcement must provide those cited with hearings in court. Springfield's red light camera citations had been heard administratively, by a hearing examiner and under Missouri law, there was no right to appeal to a court. Springfield v. Belt, Supreme Court of Missouri, No. SC90324, March 2, 2010. LINK* TO CASE DOCUMENTATION (web page) http://www.courts.mo.gov/page.jsp?id=12087&search=springfield&dist=Opinions%20Supreme&n=0 Separation of powers, delegation Does the use of administrative hearing officers in contested cases violate the separation of powers doctrine or constitute an improper delegation? Does the use of contractors constitute an improper delegation where the law requires that the government "operate" the camera enforcement system? The claim that camera enforcement violated the separation of powers doctrine was raised in Van Harken II, cited above. The court said that both legislative and judicial power resides in administrative agencies. It noted that the overlap does not violate the separation of powers doctrine provided that administrative actions are subject to judicial review. Van Harken v. City of Chicago, 713 N.E.2d 754 (Ill. 1999). California courts addressed a delegation issue. Former Cal. Veh. Code § 21455.5 required the government to operate the camera enforcement program. Because the contract provided that the city retained the right to oversee and control the functioning of the system and to evaluate the contractor's performance, for the purpose of § 21455.5, the court said that the city operated the system. Leonte v. ACS State and Local Solutions, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 879; 2004 Cal. App. LEXIS 1791. The Tennessee Court of Appeals held that Knoxville's ordinance permitting a contractor to gather and process the photos used in red light enforcement is not an improper delegation of police powers. Noting that under the city's contract the private company "merely gathers the photos and data and then a police officer reviews the same to determine whether a citation should be issued. [the contractor's] only duty is to gather the photos and data via the cameras, and this does not constitute any exercise of police powers." City of Knoxville v. Kimsey, No. E2008-00850-COA-R3-CV, May 13, 2009. LINK* TO CASE DOCUMENTATION (PDF) http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/OPINIONS/TCA/PDF/092/kimseyjopn.pdf Equal protection Is the equal protection clause violated when persons prosecuted under traditional enforcement have rights that those cited via camera enforcement do not? The Shavitz court held that absent the involvement of a fundamental right or a suspect classification, the proper standard for evaluating an equal protection claim is the rational basis test. Finding that there is a rational basis [promoting public safety] for the creation of the two classes of violators, the court upheld the red light camera ordinance. Shavitz v. City of High Point, 270 F. Supp. 2d 702 (M.D.N.C. 2003), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Shavitzv. Guilford County Board of Education, 100 Fed. Appx 146 (4th Cir. 2004), remanded to 630 S.E.2d 4 (N.C. 2006). A recipient of a red light camera citation in Tennessee argued that the camera ordinance violates equal protection by giving more protection to the vehicle owner than the guilty driver because the owner, not the driver, initially was cited. The Tennessee Court of Appeals rejected that argument, noting that the ordinance created a civil offense prohibiting vehicle owners from running a red light or lending their vehicles to a red light runner. Knoxville v. Brown, No. E2007-01906-COA-R3-CV, July 20, 2008. LINK* TO CASE DOCUMENTATION (PDF) http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/OPINIONS/TCA/PDF/083/CityofKnoxvilleOPN.pdf A review of the briefs in State v. King, 111 P.3d 1146 (Or. 2005), indicates that King claimed that distinguishing between resident drivers and non-resident drivers violated equal protection. The court dismissed this claim without discussion. Presumption Is it permissible to authorize the use of a citation to prove a violation? Under the following circumstances, a citation may be used to prove a violation occurred: the citation must (1) contain the information mandated by the law or ordinance; (2) the issuer of the citation must certify the accuracy of the information by signing the citation; (3) the recipient of the citation must be afforded a chance to provide rebuttal evidence at a hearing; and (4) the hearing officer must have subpoena powers. Van Harken v. City of Chicago, 906 F.Supp. 1182, 1195-1196 (Ill. 1995); City of Chicago v. Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp., 375 N.E.2d 1285 (Ill. 1978). Does it violate due process to create a rebuttable presumption that the vehicle in violation of a traffic law was driven by its owner? The Oregon photoradar law gives the state the benefit of a presumption that the registered owner is the violator if the state proves that a civil citation was properly issued and delivered to the registered owner of the vehicle. The presumption was upheld in State v. Dahl. The Supreme Court of Oregon held that the state may rely on a statutory presumption to prove a traffic violation. 87 P.3d 650 (Or. 2004). Two issues regarding the presumption were raised. The first was whether the rule allowing a presumption to shift the burden of proof to a defendant in a civil offense applies to a speeding offense. The court upheld the presumption, noting that a traffic violation is civil. It relied on state law that defines a crime as "an offense for which a sentence of imprisonment is authorized" or "a felony or a misdemeanor." ORS 161.515. Because the state showed that the citation was properly issued and delivered to the registered owner, the court concluded that it was permissible to shift the burden to the defendant to present an alternative that is more probable than the presumption. "The Due Process Clause poses no impediment to shifting the burden of persuasion to the defendant on one element of a traffic violation." Dahl, 87 P.3d 650, 655 (Or. 2004). The defendant's second argument was that because people sometime drive vehicles they do not own, the connection between ownership and the violation was too weak to survive due process scrutiny. Again, the court relied on the civil nature of the violation to uphold the presumption, quoting from a 1976 U.S. Supreme Court decision, "to avoid a due process violation in a civil case, 'it is only essential that there shall be some rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed, and the inference of one fact from the proof of another shall not be so unreasonable as to be a purely arbitrary mandate.'" Dahl quoting Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, (1976), quoting Mobile, J. & K. C. R. R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35 (1910). The court concluded, "[t]he legislature's determination that the registered owner was driving his or her car is not "so unreasonable as to be a purely arbitrary mandate. Rather, it was rational for the legislature to assume that registered owners commonly driver their own cars. … [T]he legislature reasonably could select proof of ownership as the point at which the burden shifts to the registered owner to prove that he or she was not driving." Dahl, 87 P.3d 650, 655 (Or. 2004). State v. Clay, 29 P.3d 1101 (Or. 2001), is a case in which even though the state failed to prove the person cited was the registered owner, it tried to invoke the presumption on other grounds. The state unsuccessfully argued that the photoradar law imposed a duty on the officer to issue the citation to the registered owner and that therefore the state was the beneficiary of a presumption that the duty was performed. The Supreme Court of Oregon held that the state could not avail itself of the presumption that the defendant was driving when the photoradar image was taken without proving the predicate fact that the defendant was the registered owner. A District of Columbia trial judge relied in part on tort doctrine to uphold the presumption that the driver was the registered owner. The court combined an individual challenge and a taxi company's challenge to the District of Columbia photoradar and red light camera laws in Agomo v. Fenty, 916 A.2d 181 (D.C. App. 2007). Citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) and Mobile, J. & K. C. R. R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35 (1910), the judge upheld the presumption. The opinion noted that in civil cases, the owner of a vehicle is liable for the negligence of any person driving the vehicle with the owner's consent and that vehicle owners are routinely held liable for parking infractions and abandoned vehicles. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the proper test for deciding whether automated enforcement complies with due process was the rational basis test, not a stricter test that applies to cases raising fundamental rights. The court noted that" no one has a fundamental right to run a red light or avoid being seen by a camera on a public street." Applying a rational basis test, the court found that "a system of photographic evidence reduces the costs of law enforcement and increases the proportion of all traffic offenses that are detected; these benefits can be achieved only if the owner is held responsible." It went on to note that the law "often achieve[s] deterrence by imposing fines or penalties without fault." As to the claim that the objective of camera enforcement is to raise revenue, not to promote public safety, the court said, "a fine does more than raise revenue: It also discourages the taxed activity. A system that simultaneously raises money and improves compliance with traffic laws has much to recommend it and cannot be called unconstitutionally whimsical." Idris v. City of Chicago, No. 08-1363 (7th Cir. January 5, 2009). LINK* TO CASE DOCUMENTATION (web page) http://www.iml.org/page.cfm?key=146&parent=2494 In a memorandum opinion, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the Portland photoradar program against unspecified due process challenges, holding that "Portland's photoradar procedures comport with Oregon law, which guarantees a hearing, provides a statutory defense when traffic control devices are improperly installed, gives notice to violators that a police officer can testify, and allows for discovery of evidence. The court cited Lasar v. Ford Motor Co, 399 F.3d 1101, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005) for the proposition that civil sanctions require only adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard. Holst v. City of Portland, No. 04-35496 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 22652 (9th Cir. 2005). A review of the briefs in State v. King, 111 P.3d 1146 (Or. 2005), indicates that King challenged the presumption that the registered owner was the driver. The court dismissed this claim without discussion. Conflict of laws and preemption Is a state camera enforcement law invalid because it differs from traditional speed law? The defendant in Dahl claimed that the state law establishing procedures for adjudicating traffic citations superseded the state photoradar provision. The court found no conflict. It analyzed the photoradar provision as creating an exception to the earlier provision and cited the rule of statutory interpretation that when there is an apparent conflict between two laws, the more specific law controls. State v. Dahl, 87 P.3d 650, 655 (Or. 2004). The Minnesota Supreme Court held that a Minneapolis red light camera ordinance was preempted by state law. The state law that preempted the ordinance was the traditional prohibition against entering an intersection against a red light. Minnesota has no state camera enforcement law. State v. Kuhlman, 729 N.W.2d 577 (Minnesota 2007). The Minnesota Highway Traffic Regulation Act expressly preempts local traffic ordinances that are in conflict with state traffic law. The court found that a conflict existed because both the substance and procedural requirements of state and local law must be uniform. Substantively, the ordinance's creation of owner liability was found to conflict with state law. In a case involving an alleged conflict between photo enforcement ordinances and a subsequent state law providing for photo enforcement, the Colorado Supreme Court found that the state photo enforcement law preempts city ordinances. City of Commerce City v. Colorado, 40 P.3d 1273 (Colorado 2002). Dedication of revenue from fines was the subject of litigation between the Guilford County Board of Education and the City of High Point, NC. Shavitz v. City of High Point, 270 F. Supp. 2d 702 (M.D.N.C. 2003), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Shavitzv. Guilford County Board of Education, 100 Fed. Appx 146 (4th Cir. 2004), remanded to 630 S.E.2d 4 (N.C. 2006). The NC Constitution provides that after deductions up to 10 percent for collection costs, fine revenue is to be turned over to the county Board of Education to support public schools. The High Point ordinance provided that after deduction for cost, the fine revenue was payable to the City of High Point. The federal appellate court remanded the case to the state to decide this state constitutional issue. The North Carolina Court of Appeals held that the proceeds fell under the constitutional provision allocating fines to the counties to defray the cost of public schooling. Shavitz v. City of High Point, 630 S.E.2d 4 (N.C. 2006). The Ohio Supreme Court held that an Ohio municipality does not exceed its home rule authority by passing an ordinance authorizing automated enforcement and a civil sanction for speed and signal violations, provided that the municipality does not alter statewide traffic regulations. The court noted that automated enforcement, supplemented, but did not replace traditional enforcement, that the ordinance specifically stated that no citation issued through automated enforcement would be valid if a traditional citation were issued for the same offense. The court found that sending the citation to the registered owner of the speeding vehicle and providing for a civil, not criminal, penalty were not sufficient to create a conflict with state law. Mendenhall et al. v. City of Akron et al., 881 N.E.2d 255 (Ohio 2008). LINK* TO CASE DOCUMENTATION (PDF) http://www.supremecourtofohio.gov/rod/newpdf/0/2008/2008-Ohio-270.pdf The Tennessee Court of Appeals reviewed the Knoxville red light camera ordinance and relevant state law, concluding that the ordinance is not inconsistent with or in conflict with state law. City of Knoxville v. Brown, No. E2007-01906-COA-R3-CV, July 20, 2008. LINK* TO CASE DOCUMENTATION (PDF) http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/OPINIONS/TCA/PDF/083/CityofKnoxvilleOPN.pdf The Iowa Supreme Court overruled a lower court ruling that an ordinance providing for automated enforcement of speed and signal violations is inconsistent with state law. The court held that the conflict is not irreconcilable and cited a companion case, City of Davenport v. Seymour, 755 N.W.2d 533 (2008), holding that automated enforcement is not preempted by state law. Rhoden and Canfield v. City of Davenport, Iowa Supreme Court, No. 52 / 07–0172, August 29, 2008. LINK* TO CASE DOCUMENTATION (PDF) http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6835030211656027997&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr Privacy Is there a right of privacy sufficient to preclude the use of camera enforcement for traffic offenses? A District of Columbia trial judge made reference to unspecified privacy concerns and said, "[privacy] concerns are outweighed by the legitimate concerns for safety or our public streets." Agomo v. Fenty, 916 A.2d 181 (D.C. App. 2007). Taking a photograph of a vehicle license plate does not violate any privacy right. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987) (police can record serial numbers in plain view); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986) (police can move papers covering a vehicle identification number). A California appellate court addressed the claim that automated enforcement violates privacy statutes protecting Department of Motor Vehicle driver records from disclosure. The court noted that the privacy statute allows government and law enforcement agencies access to driver records. The court held that the privacy challenge lacks merit "because private contractors are authorized to obtain the information directly from the DMV as an arm of law enforcement agencies in red light cases, and the information is used for legitimate purposes. It noted that the automated enforcement statute specifically authorizes use of contractors to provide services that are not expressly reserved to the municipalities. Review of driver records is not expressly reserved. In re Red Light Photo Enforcement Cases, No. D048882, California Court of Appeal, 4th App. Dist. 1, Div. 1, June 13, 2008. This case is on appeal to the California Supreme Court (No. S165425). LINK* TO CASE DOCUMENTATION (PDF) http://www.thenewspaper.com/rlc/docs/2008/ca-contcourt.pdf When an attorney sued the District of Columbia for a list of people issued red light camera citations at a specific location, the DC Court of Appeals held that such information is not public and not subject to the Freedom of Information Act. Wemhoff v. District of Columbia, No. 04-CV-1310, DC Court of Appeals, December 15, 2005. LINK TO CASE DOCUMENTATION (PDF) Purpose of camera enforcement Opponents of camera enforcement have made the claim that the purpose of camera enforcement is to make money, not to advance safety. "The plaintiffs argue, without legal support, that the District of Columbia is using the camera system to achieve a financial windfall for the Government. Nothing could be further from the truth. In the District of Columbia the traffic regulations forbid driving through a yellow or red traffic signal. The cameras will not operate, unless there is a malfunction, to photograph vehicles that do not run yellow or red lights. The fact that there are a high number of persons photographed running the traffic signal or operating at excessive speeds is an example of the magnitude of the problem facing city officials …." Agomo v. Fenty, 916 A.2d 181 (D.C. App. 2007). Notice Is mail service addressed to the vehicle's registered owner sufficient? A District of Columbia court addressed this issue in Agomo v. Williams which involved a vehicle registered in Texas. Over a period between September 2001 and March 2002, Agomo's vehicle was photographed while speeding 16 times. Although Agomo received actual notice and appeared at hearings to contest several of the citations, the citations were mailed to an address in Texas where the vehicle was registered. The court stated, "[t]he notices were sent to the address of the registered owner. It is the obligation of the plaintiff, as registered owner, to check for mail sent to him in Texas. Because the notice requires a response within a thirty-day period, it is not unreasonable to expect an owner to check for mail within this time period." Agomo v. Fenty, 916 A.2d 181 (D.C. App. 2007). A challenge to mail service was brought in Oregon. The court used the Mathews v. Eldridge analysis and determined that the balance was struck in favor of the state, that "[s]ervice of citations issued by first class mail rather than by more expensive means furthers the legislature's interest in providing for a cost-efficient method of achieving the aims of the legislation." It also found that a more costly means of providing notice would not be more likely to reach the driver if he or she is not the registered owner of the vehicle. State v. King, 111 P.3d 1146 (Or. 2005). Civil rights and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act claims Public officials have been sued under federal civil rights law and RICO for their role in camera enforcement programs. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld a judgment in favor of defendants in a case alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and RICO stemming from photoradar citations. McNeill v. Town of Paradise Valley, Arizona, 44 Fed. Appx. 871 9th Cir. 2002); cert. denied 540 U.S. 874 (2003). See also Hoekstra v City of Arnold, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7465 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 3, 2009). Miscellaneous issues Fourth Amendment seizure In a 2002 case, an Arizona camera enforcement program was challenged as involving an unconstitutional seizure. The appellate court found that no seizure is involved in sending a citation issued under a camera enforcement program. McNeill v. Town of Paradise Valley, Arizona, 44 Fed. Appx. 871 (9th Cir. 2002); cert. denied 540 U.S. 874 (2003). Fifth Amendment self-incrimination A defendant in a red light camera case argued that the provision under which the registered owner names the driver violates constitutional protections against having to incriminate oneself. The court held that in both civil and criminal actions, the Fifth Amendment protection against self incrimination applies. It could have been asserted, but the defendant failed to do so in a timely manner. Kimsey, No. E2008-00850-COA-R3-CV, May 13, 2009. LINK* TO CASE DOCUMENTATION (PDF) http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/OPINIONS/TCA/PDF/092/kimseyjopn.pdf Automated enforcement is not wasteful Several California taxpayers challenged red light camera enforcement as a waste of public resources. The court noted that the program does not lose money and that the law authorizing such taxpayer suits is not intended to permit taxpayers to litigate disputes that are primarily political in nature, nor is the law intended to be used by taxpayers to enjoin expenditures that do not meet with their approval. In re Red Light Photo Enforcement Cases, No. D048882, California Court of Appeal, 4th App. Dist. 1, Div. 1, June 13, 2008. This case is on appeal to the California Supreme Court (No. S165425). LINK* TO CASE DOCUMENTATION (PDF) http://www.thenewspaper.com/rlc/docs/2008/ca-contcourt.pdf Contract with vendor void as against public policy California taxpayers also claimed that contracts with the automated enforcement service provider are void because they provide for compensation that is dependent on the fines paid. Finding no evidence that contingency fee arrangements generated more citations than flat fee contracts and noting that the municipalities control all aspects of site selection, signal timing, and factors that determine whether a photo will generate a citation, the court held that red light camera enforcement contracts are not contrary to public policy. In re Red Light Photo Enforcement Cases, No. D048882, California Court of Appeal, 4th App. Dist. 1, Div. 1, June 13, 2008. This case is on appeal to the California Supreme Court (No. S165425). LINK* TO CASE DOCUMENTATION (PDF) http://www.thenewspaper.com/rlc/docs/2008/ca-contcourt.pdf Legality of fee structure for vendor's services Generally the law prevents expert witnesses from testifying if they are paid on a contingency fee basis depending on the outcome of the case. City contracts with vendors in California were challenged as violations of this doctrine. There is no merit to this claim because the contract provides that the vendor would be available to testify on objective facts about how the system is designed and how it works, not on the merits of any individual case. In re Red Light Photo Enforcement Cases, No. D048882, California Court of Appeal, 4th App. Dist. 1, Div. 1, June 13, 2008. LINK* TO CASE DOCUMENTATION (PDF) http://www.thenewspaper.com/rlc/docs/2008/ca-contcourt.pdf The red light camera programs in several Washington municipalities was challenged on numerous grounds in federal District Court. The court issued an order dismissing the plaintiffs' case before trial, finding that it failed as a matter of law. Todd, et al. v. Cities of Auburn, et al., (W.D. Wash. 2010), No. C09-1232JCC, March 2, 2010. Plaintiffs had claimed, among other things, that the fines were excessive, and that the payment structure for the vendors was impermissibly based on the amount of revenue generated. The court found the fines which were about $100 were not excessive because the legislature had permitted municipalities to establish fines based on fines for parking tickets which ranged from $20 to $250. The law required that payment to vendors be commensurate with the value of the goods and services provided. The court found that a discount based on volume was consistent with the law and that a provision allowing the state to defer payment until sufficient revenue was collected from fines dealt with the timing of payment, not with the amount owed. Right to a speedy trial In a case in which an alleged red light violation took place 15 months before the defendant's trial, the defendant argued that his right to a speedy trial was violated. The state argued that speedy trial rights are not accorded defendants in civil actions. The court held that defendants in automated enforcement cases have the right to a speedy trial. Oregon v. Greenlick, No. PRL0-25261; A127374, Oregon App., February 7, 2007. LINK* TO CASE DOCUMENTATION (web page) http://www.publications.ojd.state.or.us/A127374.htm Contractor credibility An Alaska trial judge questioned the credibility of the contractors who provided photoradar equipment to the municipality because they had a financial interest in proving the equipment to be reliable. On appeal, the municipality lost because appellate courts are required to defer to trial judges on issues of credibility. Municipality of Anchorage v. Baxley, 946 P.2d 894 (Alaska 1997). Admission of extraneous evidence May courts or hearing officers consider issues not provided for in camera enforcement laws and ordinances? The Oregon photoradar law provides that seven elements will be considered in trials of photoradar cases. One of the elements is a notice provision requiring a sign within 150 feet of the photoradar unit. In a case in which the sign was on the opposite side of the street, the trial court declined to dismiss the citation. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed, noting that the plain language of the act provided that the notice had to be close to the photoradar unit but did not specify on which side of the street the sign had to be. The court held that the trial court acted correctly when it declined to read further requirements into the law. State v. Kolisch, 185 Ore. App. 418; 60 P.3d 576 (Or. 2002). Similarly, in City of Wilmington v. Minella, the court held that it was error to acquit a driver based on her examination of witnesses on matters that were statutorily irrelevant. 879 A.2d 656 Del. 2005. Law suits for damages allegedly caused by automated enforcement Recipients of red light citations issued through automated enforcement in Texas claimed that such citations were illegal because the contractor hired by the cities was not licensed under a statute requiring that private investigators be licensed. The court noted that whether the licensing law applied to automated enforcement vendors was a matter of interpretation and without deciding the question, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division, dismissed the complaint on the basis that even if a license were required, the licensing statute did not give private citizens a right to claim damages for violating its provisions. Bell, et al. v. American Traffic Solutions, Inc., No. 3:08-CV-2093-G (U.S. Dist. Ct. ND Texas, Dallas Div., June 18, 2009). *Note by highwayrobbery.net: If these links do not work, go to archive.org and put the link in the search box.