RED LIGHT CAMERAS: SAFETY OR REVENUE?
Note: I wrote this thought paper for an American Government course
in Summer 2004. Submitted on 17 July 2004. I received an "A" grade on
the paper. Doing the research alone really opened my eyes as to how low
some cities will go. Self plug: Those of you who want to read my ticket
fighting article (plugged in the paper itself as a reference), visit
the Fight Your Ticket feature. Highway Robbery and the Ticket Assasin are two other excellent sites worth checking out, both linked from the paper.
Red light running is a major motorist issue in our society today. To
curb incidents of red light running, local governments turned to
technology used in Europe since the 1980s. At problem intersections,
cameras were installed that would photograph vehicles caught in the act
of running a red light. The registered owners received citations in the
mail. Proponents of automated enforcement claim that these devices are
needed for the safety of all motorists and to punish those who break
the law. Opponents suggest that these cameras are nothing more than
revenue generators that are rigged to maximize incidents of red light
running in order to generate more tickets. Despite assertions that
these cameras are in place for safety reasons, it seems suspicious that
a system marketed to local governments for safety can only exist if it
is not successful at improving it.
ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF AUTOMATED ENFORCEMENT
Previous studies have shown that red light running is the
primary cause of urban collisions. The U.S. Department of
Transportation suggests that 1.8 million collisions occur every year. A
2000 study by the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS)
demonstrated that 106,000 collisions were directly caused by red light
violations, leading to 1,036 deaths and 89,000 injuries.
1
Conventional police enforcement is not enough to curb the problem,
especially in dense urban areas. Not only can the police not be
everywhere at once, but also there is a risk to other motorists and
pedestrians in pursuing a vehicle that ran a red light. By installing
cameras at problem intersections, the police can focus on other
community enforcement needs. To demonstrate the positive effects of
automated enforcement, in 1999 the Insurance Institute for Highway
Safety studied the effectiveness of red light cameras in Oxnard,
California. Of the 125 intersections controlled by signals, nine had
cameras installed. In their report, the IIHS concluded that the cameras
reduced red light violations by 42% across the city.
2 Injury crashes at all intersections were reduced by 29%.
3 The IIHS termed this occurrence as the "spill over effect."
The IIHS also studied the demographics of red light runners. In a study
at a camera-equipped intersection in Arlington, Virginia, the
researchers found that the violators were younger-aged individuals who
were less likely to buckle up their seat belts, had poorer driving
records, and typically drove older and compact vehicles. Motorists who
had the opportunity to run red lights but did not had characteristics
contrary to those who did.
4
Opponents often argue that automated enforcement is unconstitutional.
These cameras are placed on public roads and are designed to only
capture images of the vehicles that are breaking the law. Driving is
not a right, but a privilege. By applying for a license, a motorist
agrees to abide by the rules. In California, the vehicle code is a
"contract" between the motorist and the state. Although opponents
attempt to bring up a 2001 court ruling involving the City of San
Diego, the court upheld the constitutionality of the automated
enforcement program.
5
During the period where automated enforcement was cut, the city saw an
increase of accidents caused by red light running by 14%.
1
The IIHS conducted public opinion surveys regarding automated
enforcement. In five cities with red light cameras, 80% of the
motorists approved red light cameras. In five cities without the
cameras, the approval rate was 76%. In a 1995 nationwide survey, 66% of
motorists surveyed approved of red light cameras.
1
ARGUMENTS AGAINST AUTOMATED ENFORCEMENT
Proponents of automated enforcement claim that red light cameras are
for improving public safety when there is scant evidence that accidents
have been reduced because of them. Many agencies considering the
installation of red light cameras often cite the 1999 IIHS report,
which delved into the effects of automated enforcement on collision
rates in Oxnard, California.
3
The study was flawed in many aspects. For example, the study failed to
mention whether the signal times, including the yellow light times,
were maintained constant throughout the study. Moreover, the study
failed to disclose how many accidents were reduced directly by the red
light cameras as opposed to "associated with." Further investigations
revealed that every pro-camera study - including the Oxnard reports -
was written by the same man who served as a top transportation official
in New York City at the time the city was considering automated
enforcement, Richard Retting. Another conflict of interest was found
between the Institute of Transportation Engineers, the IIHS, and the
corporate lobbyists who fund them.
6 Contradicting the Oxnard
reports is a 1997 study by Monash University where researchers studied
the effects of 120 red light cameras in the cities of Melbourne and
Geelong, Australia. No reduction in violations because of the red light
cameras were observed.
7
Despite the fact that there is no conclusive evidence that red light
cameras improve safety, city coffers were supplemented in fine
collections to the tune of millions. A Los Angeles Times article on
March 25, 2001 mentioned that the city of West Hollywood, California
collects $4.9 million a year from its automated enforcement program
under contract with ACS (
http://www.highwayrobbery.net).
In 1996, San Francisco became the first California city to deploy
automated enforcement. At the time, the fine for running a red light
was $104. The corporation maintaining the cameras received a $17.50 cut
per violation, assuming that every motorist paid the fine.
Unfortunately, only one-third of the violators were actually being
cited. Both the corporations and the city were losing money. Electronic
Data Systems, one of the two corporations maintaining the cameras,
canceled the program. The other corporation, Lockheed Martin, helped
the city lobby state legislators to increase the fines. In 1998, the
fine was increased to $271. Lockheed Martin received $70 per violation,
and the city received $78. Thanks to the new law, automated enforcement
was now lucrative.
8 Since then, fines have increased as high
as $340 for running a red light. In addition to the high fines, a
California motorist can also expect a point against the driving record
as well as a surcharge in insurance premiums for the 36 months that the
conviction is on the record.
Two statutes in the California Vehicle Code make the red light
cameras illegal. The "speed trap" law, CVC 40802, defines a "speed
trap" as "a particular section of a highway measured as to distance and
with boundaries marked, designated, or otherwise determined in order
that the speed of a vehicle may be calculated by securing the time it
takes the vehicle to travel the known distance" [CVC S. 40802(a)(1)].
Because automated enforcement systems use embedded sensors in the road
to measure the speed of a vehicle, it is using a time/distance
calculation, which is prohibited by CVC 40802. Although some city
attorneys have argued that this law only applies to speeding, CVC 40801
states that "no peace officer or other person shall use a speed trap in
arresting, or participating or assisting in the arrest of, any person
for any alleged violation of this code nor shall any speed trap be used
in securing evidence as to the speed of any vehicle for the purpose of
an arrest or prosecution under this code." Indeed "any alleged
violation" would also be relevant to automated enforcement systems
using speed traps.
A third statute in the vehicle code made the initial automated enforcement program in San Diego illegal and was upheld in
People vs. Allen et.al.5
Section 21455.5 of the vehicle code states that "only a government
agency, in cooperation with a law enforcement agency, may operate an
automated enforcement system." Lockheed Martin IMS operated the
automated enforcement program in San Diego at the time. Currently,
private corporations including ACS (formerly IMS), Redflex, and Nestor
are illegally operating all of the automated enforcement programs in
the state. This statute was written into law to ensure public scrutiny
and review, whereas corporate policies are usually not. Prior to the
2001 ruling in San Diego, Lockheed Martin selected intersections with
high traffic volume and short yellow light times in order to maximize
revenue.
9 Other cities have also illegally operated red
light cameras in favor of maximizing revenue. Culver City, California
employed short yellow times against the recommendations based on the
85th percentile of free-flowing traffic and have reduced yellow light
times at other high volume intersections.
10 Recently, Costa
Mesa, California has overturned 579 convictions prior to February 12,
2004 due to an illegally operated camera. Through a records request, a
defendant discovered that the photo-enforced signal had a short yellow
light time.
11
Automated enforcement targets only honest citizens, regardless of
driving habits or records. CVC 210 necessitates a "clear photograph of
a vehicle's license plate and the driver of the vehicle." Motorists who
wish to avoid being cited can either remove the front license plate
from their vehicles or block their faces as they traverse through an
intersection. The worst-case scenario in this situation would be to
receive a fix-it ticket for not having a front license plate [CVC S.
5200(a)]. Dishonest motorists can also perjure themselves by claiming
that the photographed drivers are not them. On the other hand, the
honest souls who do admit guilt are subject to the nation's highest
fines, a point on the driving record, and outrageous insurance
surcharges. One has to wonder if any of these dishonest acts does
anything to improve traffic safety.
COMMENTARY
Proponents of automated enforcement deem that cameras are
necessary for curbing red light running. They also believe that
increased yellow light times have no impact on stopping the problem
because motorists will acclimate to the longer yellow lights. Studies
have shown otherwise.
12
In fact, a recent study in Fairfax County, Virginia has shown that
increased yellow light times reduced the number of red light violations.
13
If many studies support sound engineering practices such as increased
yellow lights as ways to increase public safety, why have the cities
favored automated enforcement instead? The simple answer is money.
In general, traffic tickets fund traffic court systems as well
as some governmental agencies. Assuming that $65 is collected in fines
for each of the estimated six million tickets issued in California
alone annually, the total amounts to over $400 million.
14
This figure does not take into consideration insurance surcharges,
which can be as much as 15% per year for three years; and money
siphoned off for traffic school as well as prevention devices such as
anti-photo sprays and license plate covers. In automated enforcement
cases, contractors take a significant cut of each fine. It does not
take a rocket scientist to figure out how lucrative this business is.
To streamline the traffic court system, in 1969 the California
state legislature introduced a new class of crime called the
infraction. In exchange for no jail time, defendants were denied the
right to a jury trial as well as representation by a public defender
(19.6 PC). In today's traffic court system, the police officer serves
as both a witness for "the people" and as the prosecutor. Without a
jury, the checks and balances on the state are effectively eroded. With
little or no legal experience, many defendants are simply unable to
defend themselves in court. Out of the less than 1% of Californians who
contest their traffic tickets, roughly over 90% lose their case when
the citing officer appears.
14
As for the other 99% who choose not to fight, most do so because they
are often ignorant of their rights, inconvenienced by the system, or
intimidated by their courtesy notices. Those who are brave enough to
fight in person must make two appearances. At the first appearance,
defendants are formally arraigned. Those who plead "not guilty" are
often inconvenienced to the maximum until the guilty pleas are heard.
Once it is their turn, they are asked to make a second appearance to
stand trial.
15 Since the amount lost from missing work
roughly amounts to the original fine, most do not bother and give up.
Police officers and traffic courts know this.
Red light camera cases further distort the traffic court
system. Employees of the contractors - "technicians" - who determine
the guilt of the alleged violators typically examine red light running
incidents. These witnesses are never available for cross-examination at
a trial, a fundamental right. Rather, a police officer - trained by the
contractor - presents the photos and data. In reality, the corporation
itself is using the police department and the traffic court system as
its stand-in to determine the guilt of defendants. With the prosecution
lacking a witness - a police officer who allegedly observed a violation
- the judge or commissioner himself is the prosecutor, judge, jury, and
executioner. All too often, traffic court judges understand less about
automated enforcement than the average motorist. Out of ignorance or
bias for the police, these judges rubber-stamp the evidence and easily
find motorist after motorist guilty. Marketing and agency reports boast
99% conviction rates in automated enforcement cases.
1 It's because 98% of the defendants simply pay the fine or ask for traffic school (same as pleading guilty)!
To further maximize the stream of ticket generation, red light camera
contractors have engaged in devious tactics such as shortening yellow
light times at high volume intersections or "churning" - cycling
signals too quickly. Often, the green light can last as little as in 15
seconds. Although "churning" signals are perfectly legal, it would
appear suspicious when the signal is combined with a red light camera.
Another type of churning involves left-turn signals that are photo
enforced. All too often these signals have very short greens or are not
activated (
http://www.highwayrobbery.net).
At intersections where left turns can be made facing either a green
arrow or a green light, the green arrow is rarely ever given to
motorists. Combined with a red light camera, it becomes a game of
Russian roulette in order to beat the light. Fortunately there are
brave defendants who call the bluffs of the city and the camera
contractors, resulting in the overturning of convictions.
When confronted with accusations of revenue-generation,
proponents of automated enforcement claim that red light cameras are
not about revenue but rather safety. Local governments are often
hesitant to increase yellow light times in lieu of camera installation,
even if studies have favored opponents' views. Given that fines for
running red lights are very steep in California, it is easy to see why
local governments choose automated enforcement after intense lobbying
by corporations in the automated enforcement business. After all,
corporations exist to make money. Given that both cities and
corporations split generous amounts of each fine, the more tickets that
can be issued, the more convictions, the more revenue that flows in -
benefiting both the cities and the contractors. If red light violations
stopped occurring at camera-enforced intersections, the river of fines
dries up. These corporations would not heavily invest in automated
enforcement systems if it succeeds in stopping red light running.
Although proponents argue that any loss of money is fine as long as the
investment was wise, it would seem contrary that a system marketed to
cities in order to improve motorist safety could only endure if it is
not successful at improving it. Therefore, corporations and cities
require motorists to continue running red lights in order to keep the
system cost-effective. In Modesto, California, a city that recently
approved the installation of ten red light cameras under contract with
Redflex, predicted that four violations would be needed per day per
intersection to break even.
1
What is to stop Redflex or the city from manipulating the traffic
signals without the public's knowledge? Culver City, California,
another city served by Redflex, has not only engaged in shortening
yellow light times, but regularly prosecutes violations by 0.1 second.
10
Without public scrutiny, the corporations have free reign to find
defendants guilty, which is the only verdict that guarantees profit.
Proponents of automated enforcement often sing praises about its popularity with the public.
1 To quote Patrick Mulroy, who operates a web site on fighting traffic tickets (The Ticket Assasin):
"Supporters of automated enforcement claim that
their revenue cyborgs are popular with the public. If they are so
popular, why are they housed in bullet-resistant casings? I'm not
nearly as popular as they claim these machines are, but I'm not worried
about people shooting at me."16
The ultimate weakness of automated enforcement is that the driver is
never correctly identified. Registered owners of the vehicles involved
are sent notices in the mail. These defendants are never mandated to
sign a promise to appear in court, as is the case in conventional
traffic stops. By pleading guilty, these owners confirm the guesses
made by the cities and contractors. The right to due process is eroded
in a bright flash of light. Taking pictures of vehicles - perhaps not
even being driven by the registered owners at the time - does nothing
to stop those incidents of red light running. With traffic courts
serving roles as assembly lines for convictions, motorists are being
ripped off and denied justice in favor of profits by private
corporations. In their pursuit of profits, there are no boundaries for
motorist abuse.
REFERENCES
1. Wasden, R (2004) Automated Red Light Enforcement Program. City of
Modesto Council Agenda Report: June 8, 2004. Accessed 14 July 2004.
http://www.ci.modesto.ca.us/ccl/agenda/ar/2004/06/ar040608-16.pdf
2. Retting, RA; Williams, AF; Farmer, CM; and Feldman, A
(1999) Evaluation of red light camera enforcement in Oxnard,
California. Accident Analysis and Prevention 31: 169-174.
3. Retting, RA and Kyrychenko, S (2002) Crash reductions
associated with red light camera enforcement in Oxnard, California.
American Journal of Public Health 92(11): 1822-1825.
4. Retting, RA and Williams, AF (1996) Characteristics of red
light runners: results of a field investigation. Itasca, IL. Journal of
Safety Research 27(1): 9-15.
5. Re: Red Light Camera Cases, People of the State of
California vs. John Allen, et.al. (Super. Ct. San Diego County, 2001,
No. 57927SD)
http://www.highwayrobbery.net/TickRedCamArmeycasessdmotion.asp
6. Armey, R (2001) The red light running crisis: Is it
intentional? Office of the Majority Leader: U.S. House of
Representatives. Accessed 14 July 2004.
http://www.highwayrobbery.net/TickRedCamArmeysfinalreport.pdf
7. Kent S, Corben B, Fildes B, Dyte D (1997) Red Light Running
Behaviour at Red Light Camera and Control Intersections. Monash
University Accident Research Centre 73.
http://www.general.monash.edu.au/muarc/rptsum/es73.htm
8. Mulroy, P (2004) Automated Red Light Enforcement Only
Targets Honest Citizens. Ticket Assasin. Accessed 14 July 2004.
9. Tait, AF (2001) The Impact of Yellow Light Phase Timing on
the Red Light Camera Program in San Diego, California. Accessed 15 July
2004. http://www.highwayrobbery.net/TickRedCamArmey01rlcdt-rep.asp
10. City of Culver City, California. Red Light Cameras.
Accessed 15 July 2004.
http://www.highwayrobbery.net/redlightcamscameras.htm#Culver_City
11. May 27, 2004, Costa Mesa: Yellow Too Short. Red Light
Cameras. Accessed 15 July 2004.
http://www.highwayrobbery.net/redlightcamscameras.htm#Costa_Mesa
12. Yellow Light Myths. National Motorist Association.
Accessed 15 July 2004.
13. Red Light Citations Drop Below One Per Day. National
Motorist Association. Accessed 15 July 2004.
14. Brown, DW (2001) Fight Your Ticket in California, 9th ed. Nolo. 18/2-18/3.
15. JP's Fight Your Ticket (2004). Accessed 15 July 2004. http:/www.highwayrobbery.net/ticket/fytindex.html
16. Mulroy, P (2004) The Technology Statement Explained. Ticket
Assasin. Accessed 15 July 2004.